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Article 3

COONEY v. OSGOOD MACHINERY, INC. :*A LESS

THAN COMPLETE "CONTRIBUTION"
Linda J. Silberman*
The recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc.' invites a reassessment of
constitutional limits in choice-of-law decisionmaldng.2 The
other two commentators in this Symposium,3 and the New
York Court of Appeals itself, focused attention on whether
applying the more liberal New York rule-which would permit
a contribution claim by a joint tortfeasor against an employer
after payment from the Missouri compensation fund-would
run afoul of the constitutional standard. The Court of Appeals
ultimately held that even though the application of New York
" 81 N.Y.2d 66, 612 N.E.2d 277, 595 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1993).
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; B.A., University of
Michigan, 1965; J.D., University of Michigan, 1968.
81 N.Y.2d 66, 612 N.E.2d 277, 595 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1993).
2 There is an extensive body of scholarship exploring these limits. See, e.g.,
Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958), reprinted in BRAINERD
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188-282 (1963); Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 94 (1976); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and
Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUm. L.
REV. 249 (1992); James Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1976); Gene R. Shreve, Interest Analysis as Constitutional
Law, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 67 (1988); Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the
Law Applied: Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67 (1988);
Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a
State's Choice of Law, 44 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1959); see also Symposium, Choice of
Law Theory After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1981)
(contributions by David F. Cavers, Jack Davies, Robert A. Leflar, James A.
Martin, Willis L.M. Reese, Robert A. Sedler, Linda Silberman, Aaron D. Twerski,
Arthur von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, and Russell J. Weintraub). For a
general review of the constitutional cases, see RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 511-72 (3d ed. 1986).
' Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis, Party Expectations, and Judicial Method
in Conflicts Torts Cases: Reflections on Cooney v. Osgood Machinery, Inc., 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1323 (1994); Aaron D. Twerski, A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing:
Territorialism in the Guise of Interest Analysis in Cooney v. Osgood Machinery,
Inc., 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1351 (1994).
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law would be constitutional, an appropriate analysis of conflictof-law principles directed a choice of Missouri law. Curiously,
neither the Court of Appeals nor my conflicts colleagues
thought it necessary to comment on the constitutionality of the
choice-of-law actually selected by the court. But my own
reading and analysis of the case suggests that it is the choice
of Missouri law that actually poses the more interesting
constitutional dilemma.
I begin with a brief review of the Cooney facts. The
plaintiff-employee, Dennis Cooney, a Missouri resident, was
injured on the job while cleaning a piece of machinery at the
plant of his Missouri employer, Mueller, Inc. The machine in
question was a sixteen-foot-wide "bending roll" manufactured
in New York sometime in 1957 or 1958 by a now-defunct
manufacturer and sold by Osgood, a New York sales agent, to
a New York company, American Standard. Many years later,
the machine was obtained in an unknown manner by a third
company which, prior to going out of business, sold it to the
Mueller Company.
After his injury, Cooney filed for and received workers'
compensation benefits from Mueller. Although barred from
bringing any additional action against his employer under
Missouri law, Cooney was permitted to bring a tort action
against other third parties,4 and he commenced such an action
against Osgood, the original sales agent, in New York. The suit
was brought in New York apparently because Osgood is a New
York company with insufficient activity in Missouri to be
subjected to jurisdiction there.5 Having been sued, Osgood
then sought contribution from Mueller, Cooney's Missouri
employer,6 which apparently conducts sufficient business

" Allowing suit by the employee against third parties other than the employer
is the rule in all jurisdictions. See 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 71 (1992).
' The New York Court of Appeals called attention to this point. Cooney, 81
N.Y.2d at 70, 612 N.E.2d at 279, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 921. This apparent lack of
jurisdiction over Osgood is a point to which I will return in connection with the
constitutional choice-of-law analysis.
6 Apparently Osgood also joined American Standard (to whom Osgood had sold
the bending roll) and Hill Acme (the successor in interest to the manufacturer) as
defendants in the contribution action. Id. No further developments with respect to
claims for contribution against the other defendants are mentioned in the Court of
Appeals' opinion.
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activity in New York to render itself amenable to jurisdiction
there. Mueller invoked the Missouri workers' compensation
statute, which shields employers from both direct claims by
employees and contribution claims by others. Osgood argued
for the application of New York law, which allows a defendant
that pays more than its fair share of a judgment, as
apportioned by the fact-finder in terms of comparative fault, to
recover the difference from a third-party joint-tortfeasor,
including an employer that has paid workers' compensation
benefits. Thus, under New York law, the fact that the
contribution claim seeks relief from the employer does not bar
the claim.
In addressing the choice-of-law question, the New York
Court of Appeals first considered whether the application of
New York law was even permitted under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
Identifying a number of contacts with New York, including the
third-party defendant's general business activities, the domicile
of the third-party plaintiff and the alleged tortious conduct of
the third-party plaintiff in New York, the Court of Appeals
held that, under the test of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,
New York had "sufficient interest in the litigation."'
Perhaps it is the Court of Appeals' characterization of the
legal standard-sufficient interest in the litigation-that
explains why it did not proceed to question whether application of Missouri law would likewise be constitutional. There
is little doubt that Missouri's workers' compensation legislation
is directly tied to its rule prohibiting all claims, including
claims for contribution against the employer. But "interest in
the litigation" is only one part of the constitutional test. After
all, choice-of-law rules are applied to particular parties, and
here Osgood-the initial defendant in the suit and the party
The Court of Appeals stated that:
New York's contacts ..

. are, in the aggregate, sufficient to satisfy the

constitutional threshold. Osgood has alleged that Mueller has a
substantial presence in this State, and there is indication in the record
that Mueller does business in New York. Additionally, Osgood, which
seeks contribution under New York law, is a domiciliary of this State.
Finally, Osgood's alleged tortious conduct with respect to the machine
arose in New York, where the machine was ordered, operated for several
years, and eventually shipped out of State.
Cooney, at 71, 612 N.E.2d at 280, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
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seeking contribution--did nothing to subject itself to Missouri
law whatsoever. Indeed, the Court of Appeals recognized
Osgood's lack of connection with Missouri by its statement that
Osgood probably was not subject to jurisdiction in Missouri.8
And although never directly addressed, it is most likely New
York law that provided Cooney, the employee, with a right to
proceed against Osgood at all. Osgood was a New York
defendant who allegedly participated in the New York product
distribution chain resulting in injury to the plaintiff in
Missouri. Thus, it is not at all clear that Missouri liability law
constitutionally could have reached Osgood. 9
Before focusing on the constitutional problem, however, an
examination of why the Court of Appeals opted to apply
Missouri law on the contribution issue as a choice-of-law
matter is useful. To some degree, the court concluded that the
Neumeier rules control and that the case invited an application

8 Though

the New York Court of Appeals does not cite it by name, the

Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980), provides support for that proposition. In World-Wide Volkswagen, a
regional distributor and New York dealer locally sold an Audi to a New York
resident, who was later injured in an accident in Oklahoma as a result of the
car's alleged defective gas tank and fuel design. The Supreme Court held that
because the defendants had not directly or indirectly attempted to serve the
Oklahoma market, jurisdiction by the Oklahoma courts over them was
constitutionally prohibited.
' This argument is based on a view that due process limits on adjudicatory
jurisdiction inform the relevant constitutional limits on legislative jurisdiction, i.e.,
choice of law. I have made this claim in several prior articles. See, e.g., Andreas
F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, Choice of Law and the Supreme Court: A
Dialogue Inspired by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 841,
852 (1981) (suggesting that the jurisdictional limits of World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson are more appropriate as constraints on applicable law); Linda J.
Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court: Toward Presumptive Rules
of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 590
(1991) (distinguishing the consequences of jurisdictional and choice-of-law rules and
underscoring the importance of meaningful choice-of-law restraints); Linda J.
Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation? Federal Choice-of-Law
ConstraintsAfter Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 103, 119-29
(1981) (identifying cases in which courts appear to require party to engage in
purposeful activity in a state as a condition for that state to apply its law to that
party) [hereinafter Silberman, Federal Choice-of-law Constraints]; Linda J.
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 88
(1978) ("[t]o believe that a defendant's contacts with the forum state should be
stronger under the due process clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of
law is to believe that an accused is more concerned with where he will be hanged
than whether") [hereinafter Silberman, End of An Era].
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of Rule 2.10 New York provides a remedy to limit the loss of
its New York tortfeasor while Missouri immunizes its residentemployer. Under the Neumeier rules, the conflict in splitdomicile cases is resolved by applying the law of the place of
the accident. In host-guest cases like Neumeier itself, this tiebreaker rule-the place of accident-makes sense since the
locus state is the place with which both parties have
voluntarily associated themselves. In the context of workers'
compensation and contribution claims, the court acknowledged
that such a rule works less well and conceded "some
validity"" to Osgood's argument that it did nothing to affiliate
itself with Missouri.

" Those rules were developed through a series of New York host-guest statute
cases decided by the New York Court of Appeals: Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), was followed by Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965), Macey v. Rozbicki, 18
N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966), Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d
569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), and, finally, Neumeier v. Kuehner,
31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). Rule 2, which covers the
situation where the host is domiciled in an immunity state and the guest in a
state that permits recovery, provides:
When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that
state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be
held liable by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon
him under the tort law of the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely,
when the guest was injured in the state of his own domicile and its law
permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state should not-in
the absence of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law
of his state as a defense.
Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
The Neumeier rules have been extended to issues other than host-guest
statutes, sometimes less categorically. See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc.,
65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985) (applying the Neumeier
rules to the issue of charitable immunity and using interest analysis to bolster the
result). For a description of the present contours of New York conflicts law, see
Patrick J. Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 ALB. L. REV. 883, 904-11 (1993)
(New York law has moved away from the conflicts pragmatism of Babcock to a
"new formalism"); Friedrich K. Juenger, Babcock v. Jackson Revisited: Judge Fuld's
Contribution to American Conflicts Law, 56 ALB. L. REV. 727, 740 (1993)
(characterizing Schultz as "unbridled eclecticism" in adopting Judge Fuld's rules,
interest analysis, multilateralist values of comity and predictability, condemnation
of forum shopping and public policy); Gary J. Simson, The Neumeier-Schultz Rules:
How Logical a "Next Stage in the Evolution of the Law" After Babcock?, 56 ALB.
L. REv. 913, 916 (1993) (Neumeier-Schultz rules do not lead to any degree of
consistency in application). For an earlier and comprehensive review of the New
York case law, see Harold Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83

COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983).

" Cooney, 81 N.Y.2d at 77, 612 N.E.2d at 283, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
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Turning to an assessment of interests, the Court of

Appeals found competing interests in both New York and
Missouri and pronounced them "irreconcilable." 2 In choosing
between such "irreconcilable" interests, the Court of Appeals
returned to the same Neumeier default rule, rationalizing that
the place of injury rule is traditional and neutral, and that it
eliminates forum shopping. 3 However, the Court of Appeals
remained troubled-and properly so-in that the place of
injury rule is an attractive one precisely because it is often the
place with which both parties voluntarily have associated
themselves. 4 On the Cooney facts, Osgood had no relationship
whatsoever to Mueller or to Missouri and hardly could have
anticipated subjecting itself to this regime of Missouri law.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals relied on the reasonable
expectations of the parties to justify its choice of Missouri
rather than New York law. The court rationalized that
Osgood's allegedly tortious activity occurred in 1958,
substantially before principles of fall contribution were part of
New York law and, therefore, that Osgood could not have
justifiably relied on the New York principle of full
contribution.15 The Court of Appeals failed to take into

The Court of Appeals explained:
To the extent we allow contribution against Mueller, the policy
underlying the Missouri workers' compensation scheme will be offended.
Conversely, to the extent Osgood is required to pay more than its
equitable share of a judgment, the policy underlying New York's
contribution law is affronted. It is evident that one State's interest
cannot be accommodated without sacrificing the other's, and thus an
appropriate method for choosing between the two must be found.
Id. at 76, 612 N.E.2d at 283, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
13 Id.
at 76-77, 612 N.E.2d at 283, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
" The Court of Appeals conceded:
In this case, there is some validity to Osgood's argument that it did
nothing to affiliate itself with Missouri. Indeed, a decade after Osgood's
last contact with the bending roll, the machine wound up in Missouri
through no effort, or even knowledge, of Osgood. Moreover, the record
establishes that Osgood was not in the business of distributing goods
nationwide, but limited its activities to New York and parts of
Pennsylvania, and thus Osgood may not have reasonably anticipated
becoming embroiled in litigation with a Missouri employer.
Id. at 77, 612 N.E.2d at 283, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
1
[I]n ordering its business affairs Osgood could have had no reasonable
expectation that contribution would be available in a products liability
action arising out of the sale of industrial equipment. Indeed, Osgood's
activity in connection with the bending roll occurred in 1958, some 14
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account, however, that in 1958 a participant in a chain of
distribution, such as Osgood, would not have had any
expectation of exposure to strict liability product claims at
all. 6
Professors Twerski and Sedler approve the Court of
Appeals decision in Cooney for different reasons. Professor
Sedler expressly disclaims the importance of the "expectations"
of Osgood, the New York distributor, stating that he does not
believe that the result should or would be any different if the
product had been manufactured at a time when New York did
recognize contribution." Rather, Professor Sedler argues that
the Missouri employer's expectations are the ones that count,
and that immunity from contribution is an integral part of
Missouri workers' compensation policy at stake in any
Missouri work-related injury." Therefore, he favors a choiceof-law approach emphasizing the expectations of the employer
that has taken out workers' compensation insurance in return
for a limitation on its liability. 9
As a general matter, I, too, favor a set of rules that
eliminates the ad hoc quality involved in the evaluation of

years before Dole was decided and the principles of full contribution were
introduced into our law.
Id., 612 N.E.2d at 284, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
"0The expansion of strict product liability rules to manufacturers, sellers, and
others in the distribution line did not occur until the early 1960s. See Vandermark
v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); see also William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). For a general overview, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 commentary and Reporter's Note at 1-9 (Tentative Draft No.
1, Apr. 12, 1994) (Commercial Seller's Liability for Harm Caused by Defective
Products).
n See Sedler, supra note 3, at 1342.
, Id. at 1342-43.
19 In an earlier article, Professor Sedler identified "rules of choice of law" for
tort cases which are based on actual case decisions. See Robert A. Sedler, Rules of
Choice of Law Versus Choice of Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts
Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975 (1977). Revising his "ninth 'rule of choice of law"
now to include the problem of contribution in workers' compensation cases,
Professor Sedler recasts the rule as follows:
The tort liability of an employee who is covered by workers'
compensation and the liability of the employer for contribution to a thirdparty tortfeasor in a claim involving that employee is determined by the
law of the state where the employer has taken out workers' compensation
to cover the particular employee.
See Sedler, supra note 3, at 1338-39.
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interests. And in most cases involving contribution, the
manufacturer and/or distributor will have had sufficient
voluntary association with the place of injury so that
application of that state's contribution rule should not pose a
problem. But in cases like Cooney, where a party has done
nothing to affiliate itself with a particular regime of law, a
principle of non-unilateralism embraced by choice-of-law theory
generally or by the Constitution specifically should offer a
limitation on the application of that law.20 Thus, I have no
problem with Professor Sedler's "Ninth 'Rule of Choice-of-law"
as a general proposition,21 but I would argue that this rule
may be applied only if a party has undertaken action that
brings it within the regime of the locus state's law." A local
New York distributor that has not put itself in the interstate
distribution chain should not be subject to such a unilateral
imposition of law. Moreover, Professor Sedler, like the Court
20 Silberman, Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints, supra note 9, at 110-14, 13032. Limitations of this type have been proposed by others. See, e.g., Lea
Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1301 (1989)
(territorial factor chosen for choice-of-law determination should reflect aggrieved
party's voluntary submission to law that is chosen); David Cavers, The ProperLaw
of Producer's Liability, 26 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 703, 728-29 (1977) (proposing that
state of harm or state of product acquisition and harm be applied unless the
"producer established that he could not reasonably have foreseen the presence in
that state of his product which caused harm to the claimant or his property"); P.J.
Kozyris, Justified Party Expectations in Choice-of-Law and Jurisdiction:
Constitutional Significance or Bootstrapping? 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 313, 338-39
(1982) (arguing that factual expectations of the parties as considered in the due
process limits on jurisdiction should be part of the due process in choice of law);
Russell J. Weintraub, An Approach to Choice of Law That Focuses on
Consequences, 56 ALB. L. REV. 701, 711-12 (1993) (party upon whom state's law is
imposed should have nexus with that state).
21 In this Symposium, Professor Sedler states the rule as follows: "The tort
liability of an employee who is covered by workers' compensation and the liability
of the employer for contribution to a third-party tortfeasor in a claim involving
that employee is determined by the law of the state where the employer has
taken out workers' compensation to cover the particular employee." See Sedler,
supra note 3, at 1338-39; see also supra note 19.
1 The Supreme Court suggested as much in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797 (1985), in which it held unconstitutional the application of Kansas
law in a Kansas class action to claims by non-resident plaintiffs against an out-ofstate corporation involving oil and gas leases in other states: "When considering
fairness in this context, an important element is the expectation of the
parties. . . . There is no indication that when the leases involving land and
royalty owners outside of Kansas were executed, the parties had any idea that
Kansas law would control." Id. at 822.
2 The Supreme Court has identified this factor in modern cases establishing
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of Appeals, analyzes the constitutionality of applying New
York law, but ignores the possibility that it is the application
of Missouri law itself that might be unconstitutional.
Professor Twerski, a scholar of both torts2 4 and conflicts,
is somewhat more troubled by, and gives slightly more
attention to, the lack of "bilateralism" in the choice of Missouri
law." He is also less convinced than the Court of Appeals and
Professor Sedler that application of New York law would be
constitutionally sound." As he explains, although Mueller is
formally "doing business" in New York and is therefore subject
to jurisdiction there, its contacts with New York are unrelated
to the contribution claim against it." As a self-confirmed
territorialist, however, Professor Twerski does not find the
arguments equally compelling. According to Professor Twerski,
the close connection of the contribution claim to Missouri, the
state of employment and injury, is sufficient. As he puts it, "A
state that was the locus of the events relevant to the dispute
has the right to speak to its fair resolution.""
At the same time, however, Professor Twerski is somewhat
inconsistent. Although he writes in his conclusion that Cooney
is a very good decision,2 9 he complains that constitutional
arguments must be taken seriously and that a suggested
choice-of-law approach sometimes may be unconstitutional."
constitutional limits on the assertion of adjudicatory jurisdiction. See Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The principle that a party
must have a purposeful connection with a state in order to be subject to that
state's law can be extracted from several early Supreme Court cases on choice of
law. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Home
Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). I explore this point more extensively in
Silberman, Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints, supra note 9, at 119-29; see also
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (discussed supra note 22).
24 Professor Twerski is a co-author of a major casebook on products liability,
JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKi, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, PROBLEMS AND
PROCESS (2d ed. 1992), and he and his co-author, Professor James Henderson, are
Reporters for the America Law Institute's project on Products Liability. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (Tentative Draft No. 1, Apr. 12, 1994).

" Twerski, supra note 3, at 1355 (conceding that the activities of the
respective parties do not have interstate connections and that "[there is no
bilateralism of any kind").
2

See Twerski, supra note 9, at 1362-65.

27 See id. at 1354-55
23

Twerski, supra note 3, at 1365.
Id. at 1366.

30 Id.
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Though Professor Twerski takes seriously and analyzes the
possibility that the application of New York law in Cooney
might be unconstitutional, he gives less credence to the
complaint that application of Missouri law also might be
unconstitutional. 3 ' His only reason: Missouri is the place of

injury

32

Although I often find myself allied with Professor Twerski
in conflicts debates, I part company with him here. As an
initial choice-of-law rule, the use of the place of injury rule in
contribution-type claims is attractive, but it is not sacrosanct.
If constitutional limitations on choice-of-law are to be taken
seriously, then depending on the circumstances, any particular
choice, including the place of injury, is subject to those
limitations. It is true that a choice-of-law determination
grounded upon events rather than domicile is likely to have
affiliating connections with both parties so that it will
withstand constitutional challenge.33 But in circumstances
like Cooney, where the no-contribution regime of liability in
the injury state is imposed on a party that has no connection
with that state, constitutional limitations come to the fore.

contrasts the Allstate v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981), decision with
Cooney, suggesting that the application of New York law would be more
troublesome than the choice of Minnesota law in Hague. Twerski, supra note 3, at
1362-65. Professor Twerski argues that in Cooney, the employer, Mueller, had a
more tenuous relationship with New York than the insurance company in Allstate
v. Hague had with Minnesota. But he de-emphasizes other relationships such as
the fact that in Hague, the insurance contract covered an automobile owned by a
Wisconsin, not a Minnesota, resident and which was garaged in Wisconsin,
whereas in Cooney, the machine causing the injury was produced in New York,
and may have even been purchased by Mueller from a New York company. I say
"may have" because the New York Court of Appeals states only that the "history
of the bending roll is obscured until 1969, when Crouse Company-which obtained
the equipment in some unknown manner-sold the machine to Paul Mueller Co., a
Missouri domiciliary." 81 N.Y.2d 66, 69-70, 612 N.E.2d 277, 279, 595 N.Y.S.2d 919,
921 (1993). The location of Crouse Company and the circumstances under which
the bending roll was obtained by Mueller are not mentioned by the Court. Here
again, I am closer to the Court of Appeals than to Professor Twerski in thinking
that application of New York law would not be unconstitutional.
3 Twerski, supra note 3, at 1365.
See, for example, a post-Cooney decision, Ray v. Knights, 194 A.D.2d 131,
605 N.Y.S.2d 536 (3d Dep't 1993) (contribution rule of New York rather than
immunity rule of New Jersey may be applied against New Jersey employer
involved in New York construction project and subsequent automobile accident in
New York; because employer voluntarily associated himself and his enterprise with
New York, choice of New York law is appropriate).
31 He
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Nor am I impressed with Professor Twerski's acceptance of
Cooney as a potentially "constitutionally unprovided-for"
case.3 4 What happens if Professor Twerski is correct that New
York law is unconstitutional as applied to Mueller and I am
right that Missouri law cannot constitutionally reach Osgood?
Have we thus reached the point where the emperor wears no
clothes?" Professor Twerski confesses that he is not
distressed. Citing Professor Larry Kramer, 6 he recharacterizes the situation as one in which the plaintiff (Osgood) has
failed to make out a case for contribution against the
defendant (Mueller); if New York law does not apply, then the
plaintiffs claim merely fails. Missouri law has not been
unconstitutionally applied; it merely has not been applied at
all. No law reaches this case."
This explanation is much too facile. After all, as I queried
earlier, under what law does liability attach to Osgood in the
first place? There is no discussion of this point in the Court of
Appeals' opinion or by Professor Twerski. One initial response
might be that it does not matter. Both Missouri and New York
impose tort liability for parties in the chain of distribution. If
Missouri, however, is constitutionally disabled from applying
its law to Osgood, then Cooney's main third-party claim
against Osgood-if grounded in Missouri law-will fail because

" Twerski, supra note 3, at 1365. The argument is that the law of neither
jurisdiction can apply because to do so would invoke the law of a jurisdiction that
has no reasonable connection with a party to whom it is being applied.
" The illogic of the "unprovided-for" case once prompted Professor Twerski to
remark about the structure of interest analysis: "The emperor indeed stands naked
for all to see." See Aaron D. Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where Are the
Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HOFsTRA L. REV. 104, 108 (1973).

" See Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1301 (1989).

" Twerski, supra note 3, at 1365-66. Even if one accepts "dismissal" as a
choice-of-law solution for the "unprovided-for" case, see Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 304-07 (1990), I find it more difficult to
understand how no state's law can be said to reach the case as a constitutional
matter. My view is premised on an assumption that tort law, in the absence of
federal regulation or intervention, is a matter of state power and that some state
must have the power to regulate the parties' conduct. My colleague, Professor
Larry Kramer, disagrees with that assumption and analogizes "constitutionally
unprovided-for" cases to the dormant commerce clause cases where no state can
reach the activity even when Congress has not acted, see H.P. Hood & Sons v.
DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). Conversation with Professor Larry Kramer (Apr. 13,
1994).
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Missouri law cannot provide a cause of action on behalf of
Cooney against Osgood."8 Nor can New York law fairly fill the
gap to impose fall liability on Osgood. If looked at
comprehensively, the New York liability scheme is not
intended to impose the costs of complete liability upon Osgood
in these circumstances. The liability rule in New York is
inextricably tied to a particular mitigation of joint and several
liability fulfilled by the role of contribution. Part of the New
York rule's purpose is to allow parties with a less-than-total
share of the responsibility for the accident to share liability
with others who are more responsible.39 Therefore, Osgood's
relative fault should be relevant to any liability that New York
imposes. New York law does not purport to hold Osgood jointly
and severally liable for the entire cost of the injury; thus, to
fail to protect Osgood by limiting its share of damages because
an out-of-state employer-tortfeasor is involved would be
inconsistent with the general tort law scheme in New York.4"
The New York Court of Appeals and Professors Twerski and
Sedler all fail to see this aspect of depegage at work in
Cooney.41
Another recent conflict-of-laws contribution case, Soo Line
Railroad Co. v. Overton42 highlights the interrelationship of
" That is, even under Professor Twerski's analysis, it is not Osgood who fails
to come forward with law that imposes liability on Mueller, but it is Cooney who
will be unable to sustain a claim under Missouri law against Osgood.
" See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972).
40 Ironically, the New York Court of Appeals considered whether the choice of
Missouri law violated New York "public policy," indicating that a "public policy
exception" might trump a choice-of-law result directed by application of the
"Neumeier rules" and/or "interest analysis." However, the Court looked only to the
differences in the New York and Missouri contribution rules and never focused on
the question of which state's law controlled with respect to the imposition of
liability on Osgood in the first place.
41 Depegage refers to a situation in conflict of laws where different rules are
used to determine different issues. In certain contexts, two or more rules of the
same state are so related in purpose that they should be "applied in tandem or
not at all." See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 72-78 (3d ed. 1986). This is the effect in Cooney, as New York may allow
the imposition of full liability on a manufacturer because the manufacturer can
seek contribution from the employer.
42 992 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1993). Professor Symeon C. Symeonides noted the
case in his survey of recent choice-of-law cases for the American Association of
Law Schools Conflict of Laws Fall 1993 Newsletter. See Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1993: A Preliminary View, 42 AM. J.
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liability and contribution rules. In Overton, a wrongful death
action resulting from a car-train collision in Indiana was
brought on behalf of Indiana residents against a Minnesota
railway company in a Minnesota state court. 3 Minnesota
apparently was chosen because its wrongful death statute
provides more generous remedies than the Indiana
counterpart.4 The Minnesota railroad impleaded the Indiana
owner of the vehicle involved,45 who also happened to be the
father of one of the victims. The third-party action was severed
from the main case and, thereafter, removed to federal
court.4 6 The railroad settled the wrongful death action with
the beneficiaries, and the third-party action was then
transferred to the federal court in Indiana.' The choice-of-law
issue facing that court in the third-party action was whether
Minnesota law (which permits contribution) or Indiana law
(which does not) should apply to this third-party claim. The
choice-of-law decision was complicated by the fact that
Minnesota law initially makes every co-defendant liable as a
joint-tortfeasor for the full amount of injury whereas Indiana
law does not impose joint and several liability, but makes each
tortfeasor liable only for the percentage of its own fault in
causing a plaintiffs injury.48 Thus, both states attempt to
avoid holding one tortfeasor completely liable for the entire
claim, but in quite distinct ways.
Without much attention to the depegage point, the district
court in Indiana found that Indiana law should apply because
the contribution-defendant car owner's contacts with
Minnesota were constitutionally insufficient to permit the
application of Minnesota law. 49 The Court of Appeals for the

COMP. L. (forthcoming 1994).
43 992 F.2d at 642.
44 Id.

" The issue of Minnesota's jurisdiction over this Indiana party is not analyzed
by the Seventh Circuit opinion, other than noting that Soo Line had been unable
to obtain personal jurisdiction over the owner because he had no contacts with
Minnesota, and that the Minnesota state court had granted a request to have him
deposed in Minnesota, whereupon he was served following completion of a
truncated deposition. The Seventh Circuit added that the issue of this service is
not before the court. Id. at 642 n.3.
'"

Id. at 643.

47 Id.

Id. at 645 n.6.
4 Id. at 644-45.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59: 1367

Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that certain litigation
contacts with Minnesota-and the possibility that Minnesota
law might have been used with respect to the wrongful death
action-were unimportant because there had been no judicial
decision applying Minnesota law to the underlying wrongful
death action.5" Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit recognized
that in other circumstances, the interrelationship of the
general liability rule and the role of contribution could be
critical: "If Soo Line had been identified as a tortfeasor and
held liable under Minnesota statutes, Minnesota would have
had a stronger interest in permitting Soo Line to lessen the
onerous financial burden of Minnesota's provisions for joint
and several liability by pursuing contribution claims against
joint tortfeasors."51 In the Overton litigation, the majority did
not find fundamental unfairness in the application of Indiana
law despite Soo Line's contention that it had entered into a
settlement on the assumption that it "'faced ... the nearly
certain prospect based on the [state] court's prior comments
and ruling that the court would apply Minnesota rather than
Indiana substantive law with respect to joint and several
liability....,, 52 The

Court

of Appeals

believed

that

in

agreeing to settle,
Soo Line gave up its rights to continue litigating the case, to protest
the application of Minnesota law, and to appeal any judgment in the
tort action that might have been crafted under the law of
Minnesota. Soo Line settled even though the constitutional
permissibility of applying Minnesota law to the wrongful death
action was undetermined by the state court and the burden of
Minnesota's liability statutes had not been imposed.53

In dissent, Judge Ripple went further, arguing that it was
unrealistic to ignore the owner's relationship with the underlying action and the fact that the settlement took into account
the probability that Minnesota law would apply. He argued
that when the liability and contribution rules were viewed
together,

50

Id.

at 646.

51 Id.

5 Id. at 647 (quoting Soo Line's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment).
53

Id.
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[tlhe result of both approaches, however, is to reduce the likelihood that one tortfeasor will be subject to complete liability for the
plaintiff's entire claim; the sharing of responsibility is consistent
with both states' approaches. The result of Mr. Overton's position is
a "mix-and-match" of legal rules, which is inconsistent with the
result that either an Indiana or a Minnesota court would have
reached."

There are substantial differences between Cooney and
Overton with respect to the constitutionality of the applicable
law. On the issue of general liability-not contribution-in
Overton, Minnesota imposed liability on one of its own and
required its own resident/domiciliary to pay compensation at a
higher level than would have prevailed at the place of injury;
the result might well be "bad" choice-of-law theory, but it is
hardly unconstitutional. The application of Minnesota law to
require contribution from the Indiana owner would be much
more problematic because the Indiana owner had no affiliating
transactionalrelationship with Minnesota. The Seventh Circuit
so held, but made it clear that had the Minnesota liability rule
actually been applied, the outcome might well have been different.
Cooney presents an even clearer case that the constitutional line has been overstepped. Osgood had no connection with
Missouri and had been a completely local actor in New York.
Under Hague, Shutts and, perhaps, now Overton, Missouri law
cannot reach Osgood, the New York sales agent, whether in a
product liability suit by the employee (Cooney) to impose liability on Osgood, or to impede a claim by Osgood for contribution
against the Missouri employer, Mueller. And to the extent that
New York law is the source of the initial liability claim against
Osgood because the bending roll had been manufactured in
New York and because Osgood had participated in the New
York distribution chain, such liability should be viewed within
the context of New York's scheme of full contribution."

"

Id.

at 651 (Ripple, J., dissenting).

As a practical matter, fact-finders often merge determinations of liability and
measurements of damages. Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387 (Haw. 1986), provides one
interesting example. A jury apportioned the responsibility for an accident, holding
the judgment-proof, intoxicated driver 99% responsible and the city 1% responsible.
The verdict was overturned on appeal because the jury had not been instructed
that joint and several liability would make the city responsible for the entire
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Cooney is a very unusual case amidst the extensive line of
constitutional choice-of-law cases. The common scenario in this
set of cases is that a forum court attempts to apply its own law
despite a thin constitutional basis. Home Insurance v. Dick,5"
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates,5 7 Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague5" and Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts59 all fit this category. In Cooney, the forum state, New
York, not only had adjudicatory jurisdiction over Osgood, but
also had a basis for applying its own law due to Osgood's New
York connections. Nonetheless, the forum chose to apply the
law of a different state-Missouri-which had a constitutionally tenuous connection to the New York party, Osgood. Though
I do not believe the Supreme Court has ever addressed the
situation, the protections on choice-of-law emanating from the
Due Process Clause should not depend on which forum makes
the choice. Missouri had neither adjudicative nor legislative
authority over Osgood; New York may have had adjudicative
authority but it had no greater power to choose Missouri law
than did Missouri itself.
I also repeat here what I have suggested in several other
places-that constitutional limitations on jurisdiction are not
an effective substitute for constitutional choice-of-law constraints." While in many cases limitations on jurisdiction will
prevent a forum from having the opportunity to apply its own
law, those jurisdictional limitations do nothing to impede another state from applying a potentially unconstitutional regime
of law. For that reason, a requirement that a defendant engage
in sufficient conduct as to have submitted to a particular legal
regime must be a component of the Constitution's contribution

amount. On remand, the jury then found the city not liable. The case is noted in
Victor P. Goldberg, Litigation Costs Under Strict Liability and Negligence, 16 RES.
IN L. & ECON. (forthcoming 1994).

" 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
57299 U.S. 178 (1936).
58 449 U.S. 302 (1981).

'9 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
" See Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 9, at 848-49; Silberman, End of an
Era, supra note 9, at 84-88; Silberman, Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints, supra
note 9, at 116. But cf. Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory
for Judicial Jurisdictionand Choice of Law, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 280-90 (1991)
(arguing that constitutional limits on jurisdiction will serve as appropriate constitutional restraints on choice of law once general jurisdiction is abolished).
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to choice-of-law. It is this part of the constitutional test that is
not met or explored in the New York Court of Appeals' decision
in Cooney.
Territorialists like Professor Twerski may be particularly
unhappy with this approach because such a requirement may
on occasion frustrate the application of the place-of-injury rule
on liability and contribution issues. However, the orthodoxy of
Joseph Beale came undone for quite good reasons the first time

around; attempts to resurrect similar presumptive rules for
particular kinds of cases-as both Professors Sedler and
Twerski suggest-are helpful but do not fit all cases. Concerns
for expectations and fairness to define the legitimate reach of
legislative authority must also play a role.

